Thai, BRN negotiators are ready to resume peace talks

Commentary by Don Pathan
BernaNews

Chatchai Bangchuad (left), the Thai government’s new chief negotiator for Deep South peace talks, meets with Malaysian facilitator Zulkifli Zainal Abidin. [Courtesy of National Security Council of Thailand]

High-level negotiations between Thai officials and representatives from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebel group are scheduled to resume next week in Kuala Lumpur after a year-long pause, as Thailand preoccupied itself with the 2023 general election followed by several months of horse-trading.

Thai negotiators and the BRN, the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all combatants in Thailand’s Malay-speaking far south, are expected to continue to look for a common ground on three items – public consultations, reduction of violence and political solutions to bring this conflict to an end.

In the previous round of talks that came to a halt in February 2023, BRN requested that its representatives be permitted to enter the southern Thai border provinces – the historically contested area – to carry out in-person public consultations.

But the plan was shot down by the Thai Army whose leaders were afraid of a public-relations nightmare. An outpouring of support for the BRN delegates from locals would destroy the Thai government’s old narrative that says the Malays of Patani are with the Thai State.

The two sides have yet to agree on the format. 

The Thai government wants everybody – Thai-BRN negotiators and the Malaysian mediator – to sit at every meeting under the public consultation platform while the rebels insist that could happen only after a certain level of comfort is reached on that issue. Until then, the three stakeholders at the table should conduct their consultation individually, in BRN’s view.

Reduction in violence

A cessation of hostilities agreement, or COHA, is a bit tricky, as some BRN members see it as a form of surrender. They insisted COHA must be a gradual process or BRN’s military capability will be depleted.

Besides the three items that have been on the table for some time now, the Thai side is expected to ask the BRN to agree to a ceasefire during the upcoming Ramadan – the Muslim holy month of fasting – expected to run from March 10 to April 9. 

Previously, the two sides observed a ceasefire during the 2022 holy month. The government deemed it a great success and wanted to build on it. 

BRN added 10 days as a gesture of goodwill to the Buddhist residents in the far south, extending the ceasefire to the Visaka Bucha that year.

But just days after the ceasefire ended, combatants launched a series of vicious attacks, reminding all sides that nothing comes easy in this long-standing conflict that has so far claimed more than 7,300 lives since a separatist insurgency reignited in January 2004. 

Chatchai Bangchuad (left), the Thai government’s new chief negotiator for Deep South peace talks, meets with Malaysian facilitator Zulkifli Zainal Abidin in this undated photo. [Courtesy National Security Council of Thailand]

Ahead of Ramadan in 2023, the Thai government was not able to secure a similar agreement, partly because the Thais couldn’t meet BRN’s request to allow an international monitoring team. Besides, the two sides had gone into pause mode because of the general election.

It is not clear if a deal could be reached for this year’s Ramadan less than six weeks away.  

Still, BRN is expected to reiterate the same requirements for a cease fire and call for the release of an unspecified number of prisoners. Should this happen, it would be a test case for the Thai government as any release of prisoners requires the Justice Ministry to take a stance on the matter.

Political solution – the third point on the table – is an open-ended challenge. But Thailand appeared to have taken the lead as both sides have agreed it must be carried out within the country’s constitution under the principle behind the unitary state of Thailand.

The three items are guided by the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called roadmap. A timeline is expected to be agreed upon by April even as negotiations on the text of this roadmap are a work in progress.

Negotiated texts aside, the burning issue for BRN is whether the movement is willing to settle for something less than complete independence. 

Since BRN members have indicated that they are willing to negotiate the third item under the constitution and in line with the principles underlying the unitary state of Thailand, many observers, including combatants, have interpreted this move as a willingness to compromise for something less than complete independence. This could be a disaster for BRN if the combatants go against the idea.

Thailand’s negotiating team will be led by Chatchai Bangchuad, deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC). The fact that he is a civilian breaks with tradition as past chief negotiators who had served were Army generals. 

Chatchai has included the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC), a multi-agency governmental body that focuses on development in this historically contested region, in the lineup. This suggests that livelihood in the far South and peace talks must go together. 

Previous chief negotiators, including Gen. Udomchai Thamsarorat, had urged civil society organizations (CSO) to serve as interlocutors in the peace process, but not necessarily be given a seat at the negotiating table. The proposal was never given a chance to materialize as Udomchai left to take a position in the Thai Senate. 

Today, any suggestion of repeating Udomchai’s proposal will likely be shot down right away as more than 43 Patani Malay CSO leaders in the far south have been accused by the army and police of promoting separatist ideologies in recent months.

Meanwhile, youth leaders accused authorities of harassment and intimidation, saying they should be able to talk about “rights to self-determination” as a matter of principle behind free speech. BRN, on the other hand, will be hard pressed to take a stance on the alleged judicial harassment.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/peace-talks-02012024151310.html?fbclid=IwAR0sziFecwhFQdLkoYgrv-RaIm2GeWq9lcpzdUcuSTnX2dhNLKW8qg_P9fs

Thai peace talks: Expect new PM to appoint civilian as chief negotiator

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

Peace talks between Thailand and Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels came to a complete stop in early 2023 when BRN said they would not return to the table until a new government took power following the May general election.

Prime Minister Srettha Tavisin and his cabinet were inducted on Sept. 5 after political wrangling and a post-polls impasse that lasted 3½ months. But nearly two months into office, Srettha’s government still has not announced who he has appointed to serve as the chief negotiator representing Thailand in the Malaysia-brokered talks. 

It’s also unclear whether Srettha has removed Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, the incumbent, from that post. The delay is not so much a tactic but a reflection of how this administration prioritizes its policies.

Srettha has other urgent matters to attend to such as restoring the faith of his Pheu Thai Party’s support base, who felt betrayed by deals it made in forming a ruling coalition with the help of ex-military rivals who had toppled another Pheu Thai prime minister through a 2014 coup.

And so it’s important to give the impression of civilian supremacy. 

The prime minister is poised to appoint the first non-military person in years to lead the negotiating team. The past three chief negotiators for the southern peace process were retired army generals. A non-military person is expected to lead the National Security Council (NSC) as well.

Official sources said the negotiating team would report directly to Srettha, who would incorporate his own key personnel into the outfit. The NSC will not take the lead on that team but will join representatives from other government agencies and ministries in the secretariat.

While the negotiations team will come directly under the prime minister, the Prachachat Party, a local party made up of mostly ageing Malay Muslims who were members of the now-defunct Wadah Faction, will take the lead in overseeing policy for the far south. They will receive a wide mandate, from development to national reconciliation.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings press conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. [S. Mahfuz/BenarNews]

However, identifying the terms for peaceful coexistence between the ethnic Malays in the troubled border region and the rest of the predominantly Buddhist country will not be easy. 

Wadah politicians were given the same mandate by the then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who, almost immediately after coming to power in 2001, dissolved the multiagency Southern Border Provinces Administration Center so that his people could have a freer hand to deal with the region. 

But the government of Thaksin, Pheu Thai’s patriarch, was caught off guard with the emergence of the new generation of Patani Malay separatist fighters after nearly a decade of relatively calm.

At first, Thaksin labeled them “sparrow bandits,” insisting that Patani Malay separatist ideology was a thing of the past. But his government could no longer deny the political underpinnings of their operations when, on Jan. 4, 2004, scores of BRN insurgents raided an army battalion and made off with hundreds of military weapons from an arms depot on base.

Since then more than 7,300 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence.

Peace initiatives have come and gone but none generated enough traction to push the talks beyond confidence-building measures, or CBM – not even after the BRN, the group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, came to the table, in early 2020.

As long as anyone could remember, Prachachat members like to blame the military for just about everything, from abuse of power and heavy-handedness in counter-insurgency operations, to obstructing progress and development in this historically contested region.

But it was their refusal to stand up for their own people against the then government of Thaksin and the army during two bloody incidents – the Tak Bai massacre and the Krue Se Mosque standoff in April and October 2004, respectively – that undermined their popularity with voters.  

According to Daungyewa Utarasint, an assistant professor at the New York University campus in Abu Dhabi, the so-called Wadah politicians were shunned by their constituency for nearly 15 years. They were able to make a comeback in 2018 with the help of Police Col. Tawee Sodsong, a close political ally of Thaksin. Together, these so-called Wadah politicians formed the Prachachart Party.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group advocating rights to self-determination for the people in the far south, said memories of the Tak Bai and the Krue Se incidents are still vivid in the minds of the locals who have yet to come to terms with these atrocities.

“Blaming the Army for all the region’s problems is Wadah’s way of excluding themselves from any responsibilities. They were more concerned about staying in power than bringing justice to their people,” Artef said.

“Justice to them is mainly about economic development. They forgot it’s also about human dignity,” Artef added.

Negotiation can be a thankless job because the Thai team was hampered by national politics that would not permit them to make any meaningful concessions to the rebels or to the Patani Malays, a people who embrace an entirely different set of historical and cultural narratives from that of the Thai State.

For the young men taking up arms against the state, said local writer Asmadee Bueheng, their political objective is non-negotiable.

“People have put their lives on the line for it and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Thailand has to learn how to deal with this sacred value that cannot be compromised,” Asmadee said.

Today, with a civilian government in place, it is tempting to believe that changes is inevitable. It is hoped that meaningful topics would reach the negotiating table and generate greater social-political space for the Malays in the far south that could lead to reconciliation.

But this blind optimism rests on the assumption that the civilian leaders understand the nature of the conflict better than the military who had dominated the country’s national politics for much of the past two decades.

Civilian leaders may have a better rapport with civil society organizations (CSO). But if the past two decades tell us anything is that neither the political leaders nor the country’s top brass has the political will to push for real changes.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/thailand-srettha-thavisin-southern-peace-talks-don-pathan-10272023104732.html 

Southern rebels welcome Thailand’s new govt with a bang

A commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Pattani, Thailand

Members of The Patani political action group in Yala urging the public to exercise their right to vote at the upcoming General Election 2023 (File Photo: Don Pathan)

Late last month, separatist rebels jolted Thailand’s security apparatus by launching simultaneous attacks in a pocket of the southern border region that lasted considerably longer than their usual hit-and-run raids.  

The coordinated attacks came only a few days after Parliament elected Srettha Thavisin as the new prime minister, and their intensity rattled the nerves of the guardians of Thai security. And with a new government finally in place after a post-polls impasse that lasted months, peace talks between the Thai government and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the main insurgent group in the far south, are expected to resume. 

In the first of the three recent attacks in Yarang, a district of Pattani province, a group of rebels used M60 machine guns – military-grade weapons that require two people to operate them – as well as grenades.

Four security officials – two police officers and two members of a provincial security detail – were killed and four other policemen were injured during the gunfight that ensued on Aug. 28. The incident lasted more than 10 minutes – an eternity for attacks by suspected BRN rebels. 

In the second and simultaneous attack, a police unit came under a hail of gunfire as it passed by a local Buddhist temple. Meanwhile, only a kilometer away, a powerful explosive took down a utility pole, seemingly as a smokescreen so that the rebels could make their getaway a little easier, an army officer said. 

Explosions from roadside bombs often preceed rebel raids, but the gunfights that follow usually don’t last longer than three minutes, said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to reporters.  

“I can’t recall the last time an M60 was used by the separatists,” the officer said. “We know that they had taken some from the Pileng operation,” he added, referring to an arms heist by BRN rebels in January 2004, when they stole more than 350 weapons from an army battalion’s weapons’ depot in neighboring Narathiwat province.

What was particularly disturbing about the attack in Pattani on Aug. 28 was that several reels of video footage were recorded at the scene and from different vantage points, the officer said. 

Some of the footage was filmed from the position from where the rebels were shooting; other footage was taken from “safe” positions as if the videographer knew about the attack ahead of time, the officer noted. 

Postings of the various footage on social media, however, were quickly taken down as if to blur the origin of the videos and to throw off investigators. 

‘Srettha doesn’t seem to care’

Some activists in the region such as Artef Sohko, the president of The Patani, a political action group that advocates the right to self-determination for the people of this historically contested region, see the coordinated attacks as BRN’s way of “welcoming” the new government. 

Artef Sohko

In other words, it was a sign of things to come for the newly inducted government of Srettha, who, in his policy speech to Parliament this week, appealed to the country’s people – regardless of their ethnicities, religions, and ideologies – to live in harmony. 

He did not single out or mention the far south, where more than 7,300 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence in the mainly Malay Muslim border region since early 2004. 

“Srettha doesn’t seem to care about the conflict in the Patani region and he is surrounded by people who do not really want to see the peace process become a national agenda as it could lead to internationalization of the conflict,” said Asmadee Bueheng, a Pattani-based writer and the author of “Rawang Tang Satha” (“On the Path of Faith”), published in March 2023. 

Asmadee Bueheng

“Internationalization means outside interference and Thailand never wanted that,” Asmadee said.

Conflict and insurgency in the far south, including the Malaysia-brokered peace talks between the government and the BRN, was largely ignored by Thailand’s political parties. 

That includes the local Malay party, Prachachat, which performed well in the May 14 general election. Campaigning on a platform that emphasized the local Muslim identity, the party won nine of the 14 parliamentary seats representing the region.

When it was safe to do so, Prachachat played the Islamic card and pandered to the region’s religious minority, such as by condemning Thailand’s legalizing marijuana on moral grounds. But the party stayed away from the peace process and the issue of conflict resolution.

That would have been a hard sell to the Thai public, who can be unkind to people who challenge the Thai state-constructed narrative and identity. Many see the Malay Muslim minority’s refusal to embrace the Thai identity as a direct challenge to the country’s nationhood.

According to an informed source, Prachachat Party leader Thawee Sodsong, who is the new minister of justice, has been approached to become the chairman of the steering committee overseeing the peace process, although he has kept tight-lipped about that prospect. In the past, the post was occupied by Thailand’s prime minister. 

Thawee has a long and personal history in the far south, where he served as secretary-general of the multi-agency Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) during the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, who was ousted in a military coup in May 2014. He was also the architect for an earlier iteration of the peace process between Thailand and the BRN, launched in Kuala Lumpur a decade ago. 

Should Thawee take the position, it will not be smooth sailing. 

Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong

Being close to the Shinawatra political family has its price. It places him on the other side of the political divide from the conservative military. Prachachat may be part of Srettha’s new ruling coalition that includes pro-military parties, but the political divide is still very much there. 

Moreover, the Thai army never liked the idea of negotiating with the rebels because they believed that military means could bring the long-running southern insurgency to an end. 

As did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the army preferred to label the separatist movements as criminal organizations. In their mind, acknowledging the political underpinnings of the violence will only help legitimize the separatist movements. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

Hint of ‘self-determination’ in Thai south rankles

Calls for a referendum gauging support for independence in the Muslim-majority region spark panic

By ASMADEE BUEHENG
Asia Times

A map of Thailand's southernmost border provinces. Image: Wikimedia

PATTANI, Thailand – A recent seminar on rights to self-determination by a newly formed student movement in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south got people running for cover after the Thai Army threatened legal action against a mock vote asking the participants whether they would support a referendum that could pave the way toward a separate state for the Muslim-majority region.

The plebiscite would ask: “Do you agree with the ‘right to self-determination’ as the underlying principle behind a referendum that would allow the voice of the Patani people to be heard so they can vote for independence through legal means?“

The army was offended and is thinking about taking legal action. Most Thai officials equate “right to self-determination” in the Muslim-majority far south to separatism.

More than 7,300 people have died from insurgency-related violence since January 2004 and the end is still nowhere in sight in spite of a series of peace talks that have yet to move beyond confidence-building measures.  

The deputy leader of the Prachachat Party, Worawit Baru, one of the speakers at last week’s seminar, was quick to distance himself from any call for a referendum, saying he was only speaking about such rights in general terms.

Other parties also ran for cover. Particularly disappointing to many participants was the leader of the Fair Party, Pitipong Temcharoen, whose party campaigns heavily in the far south, playing up local identity, freedom of speech, justice and equality for the Malay people and their cultural narrative. 

Instead of supporting free speech and freedom of expression, Pitipong’s first move was to save his own skin. He posted on Facebook that his party does not support separatism and anybody who embraces such ideas or engaged in such activities should face disciplinary action. 

Fair Party deputy secretary general Hakim Pongtigor, an ethnic Malay in the far south and a strong supporter of the right to self-determination who spoke at the event, has been under heavy pressure from his supporters to leave the party because of what Pitipong posted. 

“Declaring Patani an independent state is a crime, but talking about it should not be,” Hakim said. (The term “Patani,” spelled in English without the double “t,” refers to Deep South region of Thailand.)

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani political movement and one of the speakers at the seminar, said the aftermath of the event was a moment of truth for all the so-called pro-democracy political parties currently trying to form a coalition government.

“Instead of standing up to the right-wing media and the government’s information operation as it tries to twist the seminar into some sort of a criminal event, some of these political figures were quick to distance themselves from the event for fear of being labeled as pro-separatist. All the students were asking is whether there should be a referendum for on the right to self-determination. They didn’t call for a separate state,” Artef said.

Seeds of separatist sentiment

Obviously, the student movement that organized the seminar was pushing that line. Given the new political atmosphere in the country, they felt the need to test the waters.

As people who grew up with the constant threat of martial law and emergency decrees, legislation that former prime minister Anand Panyaranchun once called a “license to kill,” these students have observed the changing political landscape in Thailand and believe important issues such as the right to self-determination and referenda should no longer be discussed in the dark.

They also know that declaring independence for any region is a crime under Thai law.

But judging from the reaction from the Fourth Army Area, the command that oversees the day-to-day security situation in the far south, it appeared that the military will not let the new political landscape take over without a fight. 

Indeed, the battle has always been over narratives. On one side, the Malay-speaking far south is an integral part of Thailand. On the other side, the Patani region belongs to the Malays and that the Muslims here have the moral obligation to liberate this historical homeland from the invaders. 

One of the speakers at the event, Associate Professor Mark Tamthai, who spoke via video streaming from Chiang Mai, said both sides have always claimed that the people are with them. But there is no concrete evidence, such as a referendum, to support their claim.

Tamthai was the chief negotiator for the southern peace negotiation during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government.

The recently concluded Thai general election saw democracy and Malay nationalism came up quite prominently in the Patani region. But politicians had their priorities elsewhere; Patani nationalism and talks of a peace process don’t win votes.

But they can dodge the issue for only so long. At a recent press conference, Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader of the Move Forward Party and currently the frontrunner for the prime minister’s post, was put on the spot when asked if a government under his leadership would allow the far south go independent. 

Pita tried to play it safe and suggested that the conflict was rooted in the region’s livelihood, public health, and economy. His party’s anti-military stance blinded him from reaching a thorough and deeper understanding of this century-old conflict that continues to surface generation after generation.

The fact that Pita doesn’t have any Melayu (ethnic Malays) in any key position working on conflict resolution in Patani suggested that he doesn’t understand the sentiment of the people here. In this respect, Move Forward is not much different from other parties. 

The army’s critics like to point to the mistakes and atrocities committed by the state to explain the reasons for armed rebellion. But a new generation of fighters were being groomed in the 1990s when the situation was quite calm. They would surface in mid-2001 but were dismissed by the government of Thaksin Shinawatra as “sparrow bandits.”

An arms heist on January 4, 2004, from which combatants from the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) made off with more than 350 weapons, forced the government in Bangkok to acknowledge their presence. 

In fact, the narrative that ethnic Malays have a moral obligation to liberate their homeland from the invading Siamese has never died. 

The new crop of incoming Thai political leaders should know that their good intentions will not end the conflict or get the Malays to stop dreaming about Merdeka. They can be as benevolent they want. But a benevolent colonial master is still a colonial master.

While Pita’s off-the-wall statement could be excused because he is not familiar with the conflict and its complexity, Fair Party secretary general Kannavee Suebsang jolted a lot of people with his statement about the need to replace Malaysia with Indonesia as the mediator for the peace talks with BRN, the group that controls the combatants on the ground.

Textbooks on conflict studies may suggest that Malaysia is not qualified as an honest broker because its geographical proximity to Thailand’s Patani region. But nobody in Southeast Asia cares much about what the textbooks say, do they?

There is no honest broker anywhere in Southeast Asia, a region where states are fraught with overlapping claims and territorial disputes – a legacy of the colonial powers.

Whoever comes into the next Thai government should ask the people of Patani, regardless of ethnicity and race, what they really want. If they opt for independence, then the state will know that it has to work that much harder to win them over.

Who knows, the right to self-determination could be that missing term of endearment needed for peaceful co-existence. Indeed, nobody ever said governing was easy. 

An artist takes part in a graffiti event as part of the Saiburi Street Xhibit in Pattani - one of Thailand's southernmost Muslim majority provinces hit by a deadly insurgency - on February 28, 2016. Photo: AFP/Madree Tohlala 

Asmadee Bueheng is a freelance writer based in the Patani region of southern Thailand. He is the author of Rawang Thang Satta (“Along the Road of Faith”), published in March 2023.

Potential Thai PM forced to face Deep South insurgency question

Commentary by Don Pathan 
BenarNews

Bangkok

The platforms of Thai political parties have left out the insurgency in the Deep South because solutions to the separatist conflict could require concessions that constituents likely will not accept.

The Patani's Artef Sohko and Move Forward Party

Leader, Pita Limjaroenrat,  in the far South,

April 2022 (Areefin Soh - The Patani)

And so politicians stop short of talking about the root causes – much less solutions – because these kinds of discussions require them to talk about concessions needed for a peaceful settlement.

Every now and then the questions come up, often unexpectedly, and a candidate is put on the spot and forced to think on his feet. A recent encounter between reporters and Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader of the Move Forward Party and a potential prime minister in waiting, is a case in point.

The journalists asked him if his party would allow the far south to break away from Thailand, should Move Forward succeed in forming a new government.

Pita tried to play it safe, saying the problem was rooted in the livelihoods of local people. His remarks didn’t go down well with the new generation of young local activists, many of whom voted for him.

“The incoming leader must be firm. That person must not act on rumors as it could result in misdirection. We could drift toward granting a bigger budget to the army to address the problem,” he said during a news conference at the signing ceremony of a memorandum of understanding among coalition parties on May 22.

“And the problem will never end. The reality is, the problem of the three southernmost provinces has to do with livelihood, the economy, and public health.”

As expected, the social media was flooded with all sorts of snotty remarks, accusing Pita of not being creative or bold enough.

Complex, misunderstood

But for many, the off-the-cuff statement was something that could be forgiven. After all, the conflict in the far south is complex and often misunderstood.

“Even veteran politicians like Wan Muhammed Noor Matha whose Prachachat, the so-called Malay party, chose to play it safe by claiming most people in this historically contested region don’t want an independent state,” said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group advocating for the right of self-determination for the people of Thailand’s southern border region.

Of course, no Thai government had ever carried out a referendum to gauge what locals want. The closest was a research project headed by Mark Tamthai, an academic from Chiang Mai’s Payap University who specializes in peace and conflict studies. 

In the “Weaving Patani’s Dream Non-violently: An Analysis of Conversations for a New Imagination (2019),” he asked 1,000 pro-independence people in the region why they embraced this cause. A vast majority said it was their “sacred value.” 

Mark was Thailand’s chief negotiator for the southern peace process during the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. 

For Malay Muslims in the border region, democracy and nationalism featured prominently during the 2023 general election.

“It was obvious that the priorities of the political parties were elsewhere as democracy and nationalism in the Patani region were not properly addressed during the election campaign,” said Asmadee Bueheng, author of “Rawang Thang Sata” (“Along the Road of Faith”), published in March.

No one wanted to have a frank discussion about the historical grievances or why the ethnic Malays rejected Thailand’s policy of assimilation. Malays say it comes at the expense of their ethno-religious identity. 

The Thai state, on the other hand, sees the rejection as undermining its nationhood.

Muslim men and women shop at a market in Pattani province in Thailand’s Deep South region, March 16, 2019. [Panu Wongcha-um/Reuters]

While the current wave of insurgency in the Muslim-majority, Malay-speaking south began in 2004 and more than 7,300 people have since died because of related violence, a critical mass outside the region was never generated.

One reason is because successive governments didn’t want to engage in critical discussion about the Malays’ grievances for fear that such discussions would legitimize the uprising.

Moreover, for many of the past 19 years, regardless of whether the government was democratically elected or came to power through a coup, peace initiatives came and went and none generated enough traction to move the talks beyond a confidence-building measure, or CBM. Military options were always on the table.

Peace process

If Pita and Move Forward can form a government with a coalition of other parties, they will inherit a peace process that has not moved beyond a talk shop. 

But if Move Forward has the political will that it said it has, then conflict resolution for the far south could see a turning point. Meaningful concessions could very well be made and the local Malays, as well as the rebel group Barisan Revolusi Nasional, could be forced to respond.

Pita might have shot himself in the foot with the statement about livelihood being the cause of the conflict. But this is nothing compared to the wrath from Thai nationalists, as well as army hardliners that he and rookie politicians could face if his party is seen as being too lenient on the majority-Malay population in the far south. 

Thai people have long associated Thainess, or kwam pen Thai, with the state-constructed identity and narrative and could be extremely unkind to people who challenge these constructs. Kwam pen Thai has provided the platform for ethnic groups in this country to call themselves Thai.

Malays in the far south, on the other hand, embraced a different narrative. Religious identity and ethnic identity are inseparable. And so, when the Thais tried to change one side, it naturally affected the other.

Regardless, even with a new government with a full mandate from the people, resolving the conflict in the far south will not be smooth sailing. 

The roadside bomb attack in Narathiwat province’s Rueso district last week that injured two paramilitary personnel – part of security details for Buddhist monks receiving alms – is a reminder of the difficult road ahead for the incoming government. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/insurgency-question-06072023133152.html
https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-06072023233831.html

 

What to make of Thailand’s Ramadan-time ‘truce’ offer to BRN rebels

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand

Tan Sri Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin (right), Malaysia’s new facilitator for peace talks in Thailand's far South, shakes hands with Thailand's chief negotiator, Gen. Wanlop Raksanoh, in Bangkok, Thailand, during his visit on March 3, 2023. (Credit: Fourth Army Area Command, Public Relations Department)

The Thai government, in an apparent peace overture in late March, urged Barisan Revolusi Nasional separatist rebels to stand down from hostilities during Ramadan in the far south.

In a statement that seemed to offer BRN the olive branch of a truce, Thailand’s negotiating team in Malaysia-brokered peace talks with the insurgents expressed its “intention of having a good atmosphere and without violence throughout the month of Ramadan so that our brothers and sisters can observe Ramadan safely.”

Meanwhile, sources on both sides told this observer that the negotiating team representing the rebel group has now decided to sit out meetings with the Thais at all levels until after next month’s general election in Thailand.

Because Islam’s holy month of fasting overlaps this year with another auspicious religious observance, the Buddhist New Year of Songkran, the Thai side in its March 24 statement invited BRN “to help create a positive and non-violent atmosphere” in Thailand’s southern border region, where Muslims are the majority.

On the surface, the idea sounded pleasant to the casual observer and general public. But to people who observe this conflict closely, politicizing holidays, regardless of religion, doesn’t help the situation. 

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this historically contested region, “The pretentiousness behind Thailand’s suggestion is so unnecessary.” 

“If they really wanted to carry out a ceasefire, they need to do it right, like accepting suggestions from the BRN that terms of reference (TOR) be jointly drafted to allow the participation of an international monitoring team,” Artef said. 

The rebels were hoping the issue would make it to the high-level negotiation during the last round of peace talks, held in Malaysia in late February. But the Thais had other things in mind.

Thailand’s appetite for members of the international community to get involved in conflict resolution in the far south has always been low. There is a general understanding that any foreign participation has to be done on Thailand’s terms.

The extension of the olive branch struck many as something created for public consumption, as was the case with a recent statement from the head of the Thai panel in the talks, Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, who expressed the hope that the long-running conflict could be settled in two years’ time. Anything to suggest progress is being made is welcome, especially in the middle of an electoral campaign season.

Seeing no point in talking to a government that is totally focused on the upcoming general election, BRN has since indicated that it would not be meeting again with the Thai side at any level until a new administration is formed in Bangkok.

By the look of it, Thailand’s veiled invitation for a ceasefire was ripped from BRN’s playbook.

In April 2020, when Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations were in the early throes of the  COVID-19 pandemic, BRN announced a unilateral ceasefire on humanitarian grounds across the Deep South, saying that health workers shouldn’t have to worry about being caught up in the crossfire between the combatants in the long-running conflict.

In spite of an appeal from local activists for the military to stand down and reciprocate BRN’s goodwill gesture, the army at the time unleashed its troops to hunt down BRN combatants staying in remote villages. BRN said these cells weren’t part of any ongoing operation and their fighters were merely laying low while observing the unilateral ceasefire. 

However, during the first 24 months of BRN’s unilateral ceasefire – from April 2020 to April 2022 – Thai troops killed scores of suspected BRN fighters in a series of standoffs, where government security forces, who heavily outnumbered and outarmed the insurgents, surrounded them as they hid out in villages. 

As many as 64 suspected BRN insurgents were killed by Thai forces in such standoffs during BRN’s unilateral ceasefire, and only one rebel surrendered. Many of those who were holed up  fought to their deaths knowing that the odds of escaping alive were slim to none. 

So far, the Deep South has not been free of violence during this year’s Ramadan.

Thai authorities have reported at least four suspected attacks by insurgents, including a fatal one and a flurry of attacks this past weekend:

On March 29, a deputy village headman was shot and injured in Pattani province.

On April 7, two defense volunteers were injured by a roadside bombing in Pattani.

On Saturday evening, suspected rebels shot dead a village defense volunteer as he was leaving a mosque and walking home after prayers in Tak Bai, a district in neighboring Narathiwat province.

And early Sunday morning, suspected insurgents attacked a military outpost in Yala province, but no one was injured.

BRN in polls waiting mode

BRN’s move lately to push the pause button on any more meetings until a new Thai government is formed will give all the sides some time to go back to the drawing board. 

In the past, there was a problem with continuity; a new government in Bangkok used to mean a new team of negotiators. It remains to be seen if the current team of Thai negotiators – officially known as the Peace Dialogue Panel – will remain in place when the next government comes to power. 

Still, much work still lies ahead because the peace process has reached a critical juncture as Thailand, Malaysia, and the BRN struggle to identify common ground on how to push the talks along. The list of issues that need to be pinned down in the negotiations includes public consultations, reduction of violence, and political solutions for bringing this conflict to an end. 

Of late, inclusivity has also emerged as an issue to put on the table; Thailand wants other insurgent groups in the far south to join the talks but BRN thinks it’s too early to include them in high-level negotiations. However, BRN is willing to consider the participation of these groups at the technical level where in-depth discussions on the aforementioned three items usually take place, according to one informed rebel source. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/peace-talks-ramadan-04092023232102.html
(ไทย)  https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-my-deepsouth-pathan-04102023015327.html

 

Gen. Zulkifli’s first task for peace process

Don Pathan
Special to Thai PBS World

It seems like the right thing to do – a visit by Malaysia’s newly appointed facilitator for the peace process between the Thai Government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) to the conflict-affected area, Thailand’s predominantly Malay-speaking South, to meet with local residents to get a sense of what he is up against.

The visit will come five days after the February 21st and 22nd high-level negotiation between the two sides. It will be Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin’s first time chairing the meeting in a process that has been referred to as a “pool of crocodiles” by a senior BRN officer.

Numerous peace initiatives have come and gone over the past 18 years when this wave of insurgency-related violence surfaced in the far South, but none has significantly moved beyond confidence-building measures.

Even with less than a week to go, some insiders are still saying this round of talks might not get off the ground, pointing to the BRN’s internal bickering over various issues, from selecting the right person to represent the movement at the talks to the argument over which items should be removed or revised from the negotiation agenda.

Some in the BRN even suggested that the back channel, which is being facilitated by a foreign NGO on a separate track from the Malaysian one, should be ditched entirely because working on two separate tracks has not produced the desired outcome.

Malaysia has never been happy with Thailand’s back channel, but this is not to say that the BRN is doing Malaysia’s bidding. The BRN might have problems with Malaysia, but jumping ship is not in their best interests either. Moreover, the two tracks are in competition and at times have turned BRN members against one another.

Thai officials said the back channel comes at the expense of the Thailand-Malaysia bilateral ties, which should not be held hostage by the conflict or conflict resolution for the far South.

Even without the internal bickering, Thailand and the BRN are still struggling to find common ground on the pending issues on the table, namely Public Consultation (PC), Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), and political solutions, whatever that means, to bring this conflict to an end.

COHA has been described by some BRN leaders as a form of surrender and they wonder why they would agree to anything like that, while PC, the meetings between BRN representatives and the constituency, will not take place in the Patani region, because the authorities are afraid that it would generate the kind of excitement that could undermine local “tranquility”, in the words of an Army officer.

Gen. Zulkifli’s visit to the Patani region could very well generate more excitement than Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s official trip to Bangkok on February 9th and 10th for a summit with his Thai counterpart, Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha.

The excitement generated by Gen. Zulkifli’s visit may not, however, be the kind that the Thai security agencies are hoping for. Anwar’s trip to Bangkok was presented as something positive, a gesture of goodwill from the southern neighbor. Muslims who he visited at the central mosque in Bangkok were Thai Muslims, not Malay, and the two don’t share the same historical-cultural narrative, much less identity.

Patani Malay activists, on the other hand, are known for speaking their minds, especially when they have the home turf advantage. Such a scenario has the security community in the far South worried. To ensure that the locals don’t get too excited, or that the conservation doesn't get too frank for Thailand’s taste, the Internal Security Operation Command-Region 4 will screen and approve all of Gen. Zulkifli’s meetings.

The fact that Gen. Zulkifli is not opposing this outright suggests that he is willing to “go along to get along” but, in the case where Malaysia’s interest and international standing are at stake, like the challenges posed by the back channel that presented Malaysia as a peace spoiler, it remains to be seen what Gen. Zulkifli will do.

Should the back channel be ditched, the onus will rest squarely on Malaysia, the designated facilitator for the peace process.

While Anwar’s visit to Thailand was largely billed as a success, not all stakeholders in the conflict see it that way. Among them were the Patani rebels, who felt that his rejection of the use of violence to settle the southern conflict was a bit naïve. They said Anwar conveniently ignored the political aspect of the violence.

“What Malaysia, as the mediator, could and should do is stress the need to respect a greater degree of civility in this conflict,” said Artef Sohko, the president of The Patani, a political action group which advocates for rights to self–determination of the people in the far South. “The rest is up to Thailand as to what kind of concessions, if any, the Government is willing to make for the sake of peace in Patani,” Artef said.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst and a former reporter with various media outlets and publications in the region.